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1. Introduction
This paper addresses the dispute brought to the World Trade Organization (WTO) by
India concerning antidumping duties imposed by the European Communities (EC) on
cotton-type bed linen. An earlier complaint brought by India challenged the antidumping
duties on a number of points, including the EC practice of "zeroing" for the computation
of dumping margins (which had the effiect of assigning a negative dumping margin a
weight of 7ero when computing a weighted average dumping margin).' India prevailed in
that dispute,' and the EC responded with Council Regulation (EC) No. 1644/2001,
amending the original antidumping measure on bed linen from India. India was of the
view that the amended measure did not comply with EC obligations under the WTO
Antidumping Agreement, and brought the proceeding under Article 21.5 of the DSU that
is the subject of this paper.
, This paper was prepared for the American Law Institute project on "The Principles or WTO Law.~ We
thank Kathy Spier for thoughtful assistance.
I The decision in the earlier proceeding is the subject of an earlier paper in this series. See Janow and
Slaiger (2003).
2 See European Communities- Anti-Dumping Duties on inports of Conon- rype Bed Linen from India,
WT/DSI4I/AB!R, adopted March 12, 2001.
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Several issues were raised before the Article 21.5 panel, but only three issues reached the
Appellate Body. First, India argued that although the EC had corrected the "zeroing"
problem, it had failed to ensure that injury attributable to "other factors" had not wrongly
been attributed to dumped imports, in violation of Article 3 of the Antidumping
Agreement. Second, India argued that in conducting its revised injury analysis, the EC
violated Article 3 when it presumed that all imports from exporters not individually
investigated were "dumped," even though 53% of the imports from exporters that were
individually investigated were found not to have been dumped once the "zeroing" method
of calculation was abandoned. Finally, India argued that the EC had not properly
considered certain factors bearing on injury that it was required to consider under Article
3.
The Appellate Body ruled in favor of the EC on the first issue, holding that it had been
resolved definitively in the original proceeding. It ruled in favor of India on the second
issue, however, concluding that imports from producers not individually investigated
could not be presumed to be dumped for purposes of injury analysis when some of the
individually investigated exporters were not dumping. On the third issue, the Appellate
Body upheld the finding against India by the panel, defrerring to its resolution of what the
Appellate Body considered an essentially factual issue.
From a legal perspective, the Appellate Body's decision on the first issue raises some
interesting questions about the proper scope of resjudicata, issue preclusion and waiver
in WTO jurisprudence, but provides few answers. The case breaks new ground with
respect to the second issue noted above as well, and we quibble somewhat with the
Appellate Body's legal and logical reasoning there. Finally, the Appellate Body's
deference to the panel on the third issue seems appropriate as best we can determine.
From an economic perspective, we find the procedural issue to be an interesting one.
Little analytical work has been done by economists on the proper scope of resjudicata
and the related notions of issue preclusion and waiver. We develop some simple points
about these issues below, which provide some basis for questioning the refusal of the
compliance panel to entertain India's arguments on "non-attribution." Regarding the
second issue, the antidumping laws make so little economic sense in general that it is
difficult to otTer any guidance as to their "proper" administration. The ruling in favor of
India on the presumption of dumping issue seems reasonable from a statistical standpoint,
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however, although it may in the end prove a pyrrhic victory since the material injury
standard in the antidumping arena is both a low and elastic threshold. The EC may well
be able to reimpose the duties simply by rephrasing its injury analysis. Finally, the
Appellate Body's deference to the factual conclusion of the panel on tile third issue raises
no economic issues of note.
We lay out the legal issues and their resolution by fhe panel and the Appellate Body in
Section 2. Section 3 offers a critical analysis of the case from a law and economics
perspective.
2. Factual and Legal Issues and Their Disposition
2.1 Non-Attribution of Injury Caused by "Other Factors"
Article 3.5 of the Antidumping Agreement provides that investigating authorities must
"examine any known factors other than the dumped imports which at the same time are
injuring the domestic industry, and the injuries caused by these other factors must not be
attributed to the dumped imports." In the original proceeding, India challenged the EC's
duties, inter alia, on the grounds that the EC had flailed to ensure that injury attributable
to "other factors" was not attributed to dumped imports from India, although it did not
pursue the issue very actively. The original panel dismissed the one substantive point
raised by India under this rubric, and otherwise said that India had failed to make out a
primaJacie case on the issue. That finding was not appealed.
The EC did not conduct a new analysis of "other factors" as part of its revised injury
analysis when it promulgated Regulation No. 1644/2001, and had simply relied on its
previous discussion of the matter. India then argued again that the EC had failed to
ensure that injury caused to "other fhctors" was not attributed to dumped imports. In
particular, it pointed to various "other factors" that had not been a subject of discussion
before the original panel, including rising input costs bor European firms and the failure
of output prices in the EC to keep up with inflation.
The EC requested a preliminary niling from the panel to the effect that such matters could
not be raised in an Article 21.5 proceeding. and the panel agreed: "To rule on this aspect
of India's claim under Article 3.5 in this proceeding would be to allow India a second
chance to prevail on a claim which it raised, but did not pursue, in the original
3 q
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proceeding. We cannot conclude that such a result is required by Article 21.5 of the
DSU, or any other provision. The possibility for manipulative or abusive litigation tactics
that would be opened by allowing Members an opportunity to obtain a ruling in an
r,-rticle 21.5 proceeding that they could have sought and obtained in the original dispute
would, in our view, be inestimably harmful to the effective operation of the dispute
settlement system." 3 Although the panel did not use these terms, its reasoning invokes
notions of resjudicata, issue preclusion and waiver.
The Appellate Body affirmed the panel's ruling on this issue. In doing so, it emphasized
that new claims can at times be raised before an Article 21.5 panel. The purpose of such
panels is to review the WTO consistency of measures taken to comply with prior rulings.
Many such measures will differ significantly from the measures originally challenged,
and may be inconsistent with WTO obligations in ways that the original measures were
not. New inconsistencies of that sort are the proper subject of discussion before an
Article 21.5 panel. But "[hlere, India did not raise a new claim before the Article 21.5
panel; rather, India reasserted in the Article 21.5 proceedings the samne claim that it had
raised before the original panel in respect of a component of the implementation measure
which was the same as the original measure. The same claim was dismissed by the
original panel, and India did not appeal that finding. " 4 The Appellate Body went on to
hold that when the original panel report was adopted by the DSB, it became a final
resolution of the dispute on the "other factors" issue.
s
Like the panel, the Appellate Body relied for its ruling not so much on any treaty text that
addresses the issue, but on policy considerations and on its earlier decision reviewing a
similar issue that had arisen before the Shrimp-Turtle compliance panel. The Appellate
Body emphasized that India had raised the "same" claim earlier and lost, and put less
emphasis than the panel on the notion that the particular issues raised by India could have
been raised before but were not.
2.2 Injury Due to Exporters Not Individually Investigated
3 Panel Rep 6,43.
4 AB Rep. 80.
i AB Rep. 99.
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5In the second investigation as in the first, the EC did not investigate every Indian exporter
of cotton-type bed linen. Article 6.10 of the Antidumping Agreement allows importing
nations to investigate only a sample of all exporters in cases where an individual
investigation of all of them would be "impracticable." Accordingly, the EC conducted
individual investigations of five of the larger Indian exporters, and applied a weighted
average antidumping duty to exports from other exporters as is allowed by Article 9.4 of
the Antidumping Agreement.
The most important change between the original investigation and the second was to
eliminate the practice of "zeroing" in the computation of weighted average dumping
margins. When zeroing was eliminated, two of the five exporters subject to individual
investigation, accounting for 53 percent of the imports from the live individually
investigated importers. were found not to be dumping at all. The issue before the
compliance panel was how this new finding should afl'cct injury analysis by the EC.
Article 3.5 requires that the importing nation establish a causal link between the clumped
imports and injury. In purporting to establish this link when promulgating Regulation
No. 1644/2001, the EC assumed that all imports from Indian exporters not individually
investigated had been dumped, even though 53 percent of the imports from the exporters
individually investigated had not been dumped. India argued that the EC thereby violated
Article 3.1, which requires that the determination of injury be based on "positive
evidence," including an -'objective examination" of the "volume of dumped imports."
India argued that the EC should presume that dumping was occurring by exporters not
individually investigated in the same proportion as imports from exporters who were
individually investigated (47 percent). This would suggest a smaller volume of dumped
imports than the EC had presumed to be present. and might reverse the conclusion that
dumped imports were causing material injury.
The EC argued that the presumption of dumping by exporters not investigated
individually is permissible under the Antidumping Agreement. Its principal argument
was based on Article 9.4 of the Antidumping Agreement, which permits an antidumping
duty to be imposed on exporters not individually investigated as long as it does not
exceed "the weighted average margin of dumping established with respect to the selected
exporters." The EC contended that because it is allowed to impose an antidumping duty
on those exports, it must also be allowed to consider them "dumped" for purposes of
injury analy'sis. It argued secondly that the group of exporters (hat it had chosen to
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investigate individually were not selected to be a statistically valid sample, but rather
represented the "largest percentage of the volume of the exports...which can reasonably
be investigated," one of the options under Article 6.10. Thus, the percentage of exports
found to be dumped by the individually investigated exporters could not be assumed to
reflect the amount of dumping by exporters not individually investigated.
The panel agreed with the EC. "We can find no textual obligation in the AD Agreement
to separate out the unexamined producers' imports into dumped and not dumped for
purposes of the injury analysis.."6 It also found India's position to be logically flawed
given the fact that all non-investigated imports could be subjected to a positive
antidumping duty under Article 9.4: "Under India's approach, only a portion of imports
from producers subject to that anti-dumping duty could be considered as "dumped" for
injury purposes. This effectively treats the imports from the same producers as dumped
for purposes of duty assessment, and not dumped ror purposes of injury analysis. In our
view, this is an unacceptable outcome, suggesting that the analysis which leads to it is
untenable."
The Appellate Body reversed. It emphasized the requirement for an "objective
examination" of the volume of dumped imports, and noted that imports not sold at
dumped prices are specifically enumerated in Article 3.5 as one of the "other factors"
which may cause injury should not be attributed to dumped imports. It was also
unpersuaded that imports from exporters not individually investigated could be presumed
to be dumped simply because Article 9.4 permits them to be subjected to an antidumping
duty - "[w]e do not see why the volume of imports that have been found to de dumped by
non-examined producers, for purposes of determining injury under paragraphs I and 2 of
Article 3, must be congruent with the volume of imports from those non-examined
producers that is subject to the imposition ofantidumping duties under Article 9,4,77 The
Appellate Body stopped short of endorsing India's proposed method for calculating the
volume of dumped imports from exporters not individually investigated, however,
allowing for the possibility that "positive evidence" of that volume might be based on
6 Panel Rep. 6.139.
7 AB Rep. 126.
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7something other than the percentage of exports dumped by the individually investigated
exporters.X
Along the way, the Appellate Body was mindful of the standard of review under the
Antidumping Agreement. Article 17.6(ii) of the Agreement provides that "[wlhere the
panel finds that a relevant provision of the Agreement admits of more than one
permissible interpretation, the panel shall find the authorities' measure to be in
conformity with the Agreement if it rests on one of those permissible interpretations."
The EC argued that its interpretation of the injury provisions was at least a "permissible"
interpretation that was entitled to deference. but the Appellate Body disagreed:
"[W]hatever methodology investigating authorities choose for calculating the volume of
"dumped imports," that calculation and, ultimately, the determination of injury under
Article 3, clearly must be made on the basis of 'positive evidence' and an 'objective
examination.' These requirements are not ambiguous, and they do not 'admit of more
than one permissible interpretation' within the meaning of the second sentence of Article
17.6(ii)."'9
2.3 Consideration of all "Relevant Factors" Bearing on Injury
Article 3.4 of the Antidumping Agreement requires importing nations to base their injury
analysis on an examination of "all relevant economic factors" having a bearing on the
state of the (domestic) industry." It then provides a non-exhaustive list of such factors.
India asserted that the EC failed to gather data on and to evaluate two "'relevant factors,"
stocks and capacity utilization, when it promulgated Regulation No. 1644/2001. The EC
asserted that such data had been before the investigative authorities, mid had been
properly considered. The panel ruled for the EC on this point, and India argued that the
panel abused its discretion in doing so by. in effect, accepting the EC's unsupported
assertions on the matter rather than conducting a more thorough investigation.
The Appellate Body upheld the panel, which had "concluded that it was clear that the
European Communities had 'in its record' infbrmation on stocks and capacity utilization
- the two factors India had focused on - and that 'unlike the original determination, the
8 Id. 1146.
AB Rep. 118.
HeinOnline  --  THE WTO CASE LAW OF 2003 49 March 30, 2005
EC's consideration of these factors is clearly set out on the face of the redetermination."' 0
While India wished to characterize the panel's conclusion as an abuse of its discretion,
the Appellate Body saw it as a factual conclusion by the panel that was within its proper
discretion and should not be disturbed on appeal.
3. Critical Analysis
3.1 Non-Attribution and the Procedural Issue
One can quibble with the willingness of the Appellate Body to permit the EC to rely on
its original "other factors" analysis. In light of its resolution of the second issue in the
case, discussed below, the EC is required to restate its assessment of the quantity of
dumped imports, revising the estimate downward. The quantity of fairly-traded imports.
an "other factor" that might cause injury, must be revised upward. One might thus argue
that the EC should redo both its analysis of harm attributable to "dumped imports" and its
analysis of harm due to "other factors." The Appellate Body does not reach this
conclusion, however, perhaps because India's arguments focused on EC input and output
prices as the "other factors" to be considered.
The much more interesting aspect of the ruling on this issue, however, is its procedural
implications. WTO treaty text does not specifically address res judicara and related
issues, leaving to panels and to the Appellate Body the task of evolving sensible
principles in the area. In this case, the Appellate Body insisted that "India did not raise a
new claim before the Article 21.5 panel; rather, India reasserted in the Article 21.5
proceedings the same claim." At some level, it is difficult to quarrel with the proposition
that parties to WTO disputes should not be permitted to relitigate the same claim over and
over again. What the Appellate Body masks with this language, however, is that the
concept of"sameness" can be interpreted broadly or narrowly.
Recall the facts: India had raised the "non-attribution" issue in its original complaint, but
did not advance factual arguments in rclation to that issue sufficient to make out a prima
facie case. Then, before the compliance panel, it sought to make those arguments
seriously for the first time, pointing to "other factors" such as high EC input prices and
low EC output prices. Here, to say that India had already lost the same claim earlier is to
imply that all arguments relating to a particular legal issue are part of the "same" claim,
10 AB Rep, 154.
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9and are waivcd if they are omitted from the first round of litigation in which that issue
appears. The panel opinion hinted at an even broader principle when it stated that it
would not afford India "an opportunity to obtain a ruling in an Article 21.5 procecding
that they could have sought and obtained in the original dispute." This language suggests
that all legal issues that could have been raised in the earlier proceeding, but were not, arc
waived. For terminological simplicity, we refer to these principles as rules of waiver,
although the reader should be aware that civil procedure treatises often attach the labels
resjudicala, issue preclusion, or claim preclusion to these types of rules.
Rules of waiver have the obvious consequence of encouraging litigants to raise issues
sooner rather than later, and can hasten the final resolution of a dispute. Many legal
systems have them, and certainly the modem trend in American civil procedure is to force
litigants to bring all sufficiently "connected" claims at once.'' It is possible that such
rules are economically desirable when all the costs and benelits of the legal system are
taken into account, but that is not obvious. We have found no treatment of the issue in
the existing law and economics literature on procedure, perhaps because a complete
accounting of all the relevant considerations in any particular context is exceedingly
difficult to provide. An exhaustive treatment is beyond the scope of this cormnent as well.
but we will sketch some of the pertinent considerations that bear on the design of optimal
waiver principles. Beflore addressing waiver, however, we set forth our understanding of
the justification for resjudicata in its narrower sense.
Res judicata. Compliance with the law generally has social value, and the prompt
resolution of legal proceedings can hasten valuable compliance. This observation
seemingly applies as much to the WTO as to other legal contexts. But legal decision
makers are imperfect, and may make errors in their findings of law or fact. When
litigants are required to comply with erroneous decisions, error costs arise, often of the
same nature as the gains from compliance with correct decisions. A desire to avoid errors
motivates principles of "due process" in many legal systems. Process itself is costly,
however, and so it is unrealistic for most legal systems to avoid error altogether. The task
of designing an optimal procedure thus balances competing considerations: the value of
resolving legal issues sooner and of reducing process costs on the one hand, against the
costs of errors on the other.
I cites
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Because of concerns about error, it is not uncommon for litigants to be permitted to raise
issues more than once. The usual setting for revisiting issues is the "appeal," a common
feature in many legal systems including now the WTO. But there will generally be
diminishing returns to reopening issues that have decided previously - at some point, the
likelihood of error becomes sufficiently small that the benefits of ending the dispute and
the associated process costs predominate over any concerns about error. Thus, rights of
appeal are always limited (and some matters may not be appealable at all).
Resjudicata in its narrowest sense simply precludes a litigant from raising an identical
claim in a new proceeding when the claim was previously adjudicated. It can be
understood as a presumption that the legal system in question already provides an
appropriate error correction mechanism through its appellate process. Once a litigant has
raised an argument, lost, and exhausted all available appeals, no further delays and
litigation costs are likely to bejustilied.
To be sure, scenarios may arise in which concern for error is particularly acute, and the
limits on the process available in typical cases may appear too stringent. The usual
solution to such problems, however, is for the legal system to add more appellate process
for particular categories of cases rather than to permit tribunals to retreat from res
judicata in its narrow form. Capital cases in the United States provide a nice example -
because the costs of error are great and irreversible, capital defendants are afforded
additional layers of appeal as a matter of course that are not made available to other
criminal delkndants.
W1taiver. The rationale for rules of waiver must be somewhat different. By definition,
waiver applies to arguments and issues that were not adjudicated previously but could
have been. There can be no presumption that their prior disposition was correct if there
was no prior disposition.
But rules of waiver might be based on a related presumption - if a litigant did not bother
to raise an argument previously, perhaps the litigant has revealed it to be weak, so that the
likely error cost of ignoring it is small. Rules of waiver encourage litigants to bring all
potentially meritorious arguments before the court at once so that the dispute can be
resolved with dispatch and the gains from compliance with the law can be realized more
quickly; any claims "waived- arc presumed to be so weak that they need not be
addressed.
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This simple intuition may have much to do with the justification for doctrines of waiver,
but it is incomplete for two reasons. First, to the degree that complainants internalize the
costs of delay in bringing other parties' behavior into conformity with the law, the legal
system seemingly has no interest in encouraging complainants to pursue compliance at a
faster clip. Second, litigation becomes more expensive as more claims are brought. Each
claim must he researched, briefed and argued. Factual support must be amassed. Even if
the adjudicative body can exercise "judicial economy" to avoid issues that need not be
reached to resolve the case, the parties to the proceeding must still bear additional costs as
the number of issues and arguments grows. Hence, if a complainant prefers to start with
what it believes to be its strongest claims, and to leave others in abeyance should the
initial claims fail, some of the costs of litigation (including some that are externalized)
will be avoided if the initial claims succeed and resolve the dispute. This consideration,
too, seems to argue for alloving the complainant to bring claims at its own pace, in
preference to rules of waiver that penalize claimants for fhiling to bring issues before the
dispute process at the outset.
An important countervailing consideration arises, however, if litigation exhibits
economies of scale in relation to the number of claims in each proceeding. It seems quite
likely that dispute proceedings have considerable fixed costs. For the WTO in particular.
panelists must be selected and assembled for hearings. Each panelist will invest
considerable time in learning the (often complex) background facts of the dispute. Many
of these costs will be the same whether the dispute involves a single legal claim or many.
And like other costs of litigation, a complaining nation does not bear all of these fixed
costs.
The presence of considerable fixed costs to litigation can supply a positive externality to
tile consolidation of claims in an initial proceeding. Plausibly, a complainant might
prefer to proceed more or less seriatim with its claims to save itself the variable costs of
litigating matters that may prove unnecessary. But if considerable economies of scale are
lost w\'hen the complainant proceeds in this fashion and those costs are borne by others,
the system may gain by foreclosing such a strategy.
Of course, the mere existence of fixed costs is not sufficient to justify rules of waiver.
Their magnitude must be considered in relation to the added variable costs of litigating
more claims at once, claims that may prove unnecessary to litigate ex post. Roughly
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speaking, the greater the fixed costs of a proceeding in relation to the variable costs per
claim, the stronger the case for insisting that more issues be raised at once.
These points also suggest the possibility of more refined waiver rules. Some types of
claims may have very low marginal litigation costs, perhaps because they resolve
themselves readily with reference to facts already in evidence. Others may require much
additional fact-finding or investigation. Similarly, some claims may be legally
straightforward, and others may be highly debatable and complex. The case for a rule of
waiver is stronger with respect to the relatively cheaper factual and legal claims.
Likewise, the fixed costs of each proceeding may vary with the nature of the proceeding.
With particular reference to Article 21.5 compliance panels, we note that these panels are
comprised of the same members as the original dispute panel. Each panelist is
presumably familiar with the facts and basic legal issues of the case already. Under these
circumstances, it may make sense to have somewhat more lenient rules of waiver because
the fixed costs of the second proceeding will tend to be smaller in relation to the variable
costs of litigating more issues initially.
We note one further consideration that may have some bearing on rules of waiver. The
compliance panel in the Bed Linen case noted its concern for "manipulative and abusive"
litigation tactics. It did not detail its fears in this regard, but its phrasing hints at concern
for vexatious proceedings, brought not because of their potential legal merits but because
of their capacity to harass the respondent. There is a considerable economic literature on
the use of frivolous litigation to extract settlements, and it is possible that complainants in
the WTO might hope to extract trade concession in meritless cases from respondents
anxious to avoid litigation costs. For such a strategy to justify rules of waiver, of course,
it must be the case that litigation is more expensive seriatim than in a consolidated
proceeding, presumably because of the fixed costs noted above - otherwise, vexatious
claims brought all at once would be just as effective "harassment."
Although waiver rules may make vexatious litigation less troublesome in the presence of
fixed costs, other procedural devices are better tailored to address the problem of
vexatious claims. Parties who bring claims that are adjudged to be frivolous can be
sanctioned in a variety of ways ("Rule 11 sanctions" in the parlance of American civil
procedure). A potentially effective sanction is fee shifting, where the complainant must
pay the litigation costs of the respondent. Such measures target frivolous litigation
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directly without affecting the timing of potentially meritorious claims. Hence, waiver
rules are at most a "second-best- response to vexatious litigation.
Moding the Eflbcf of Waiver Rules in the WTO. Following the literature on efficient
legal procedure, we would ideally like to model the problem of designing optimal rules of
waiver. One would ask the question whether, in the absence of waiver rules, WTO
complainants would bring too few claims at a time from a social standpoint. If so, one
would then inquire whether waiver rules could correct the problem.
Such an analysis would be extremely complex, however, requiring attention to the social
gains from litigation, the timing of those gains, and the magnitude and timing of litigation
costs. The matter becomes all the more complicated in cases with multiple legal claims,
in that the social returns to the proper adjudication of each claim may vary. Yet another
complication is the fact that WTO litigants are governments. It is a commonplace in the
procedure literature to treat litigants as expected profit maximizers, but governments
cannot be presumed to behave in this flshion. Indeed, in WTO litigation, money rarely
changes hands.
We thus limit ourselves to a very simple treatment of one piece of the puzzle that
abstracts from these difficult issues. Our focus is on the question of how a rule of waiver
affects the number of claims brought before the dispute resolution process. and thus the
total variable costs of litigation.
Consider a two-period model. If the claimant wins at least one claim in period 1, it wins
an award that it values at B1. If it fails to win one claim in period 1 but wins at least one
claim in period 2. it wins an award that it values at B2, k2 < B1. The difference between
BI and B2 reflects the cost to the claimant of delay in receiving the remedy. Assume that
there are many potential arguments available to the claimant, and approximate these by a
continuum of claims with measure A. The (small) claim i has the (small) probability
p(i)di of success. It is brought at marginal cost c(i)di. It is optimal flor the claimant to
brings its "best" claims first: i.e., those with the highest p(i)lc(i). Thus, we order the
claims so that p(i)yc(i) is a non-increasing finclion. Let (x) be the total cost of bringing
the set of claims [0, X].12
12 That is, C(x) = Icci)'i.
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In a judicial system with waiver, the claimant must raise all arguments in a single "case."
The case comprises the claims [0, x], where x is a decision variable for the claimant. In a
judicial system without waiver, tie claimant may return to the adjudicating body with
additional claims in period 2, if it fails to win at least one of its claims in period 1. In this
setting, the claimant brings claims [0, x1] in period 1 and claims [xi, xl+x2] in period 2 (if
there has been no success in period 1).
Let F(x) be the probability that there is at least one successful claim from among those in
[0, x]; F(0) = 0, F(M) S 1. The density, 1(x), is the probability that the first success comes
on claim x. The hazard rate, ftx)/[ I -F(x) is the probability that a success comes on x,
given that there has been no success on any claims before x. Since the claims are
independent, this is just p(x). Bayes Rule tells us that the probability of at least one
success before xl+x2, F(x,+x 2), is equal to the probability of at least one success before x,
plus the probability of no successes before x, times the probability of at least one success
between x, and x2, or
F(x1 + x2) = F(.1) + I I- F(x,)] [Pr{at least one success between x, and x2 }]
or
Pr{at least one success between x, and x2} = x+x1 )- F(x,)
Judicial System with Rule of Waiver. Here, the claimant must make any claims that it
wishes to advance in the first period. The claimant chooses x > 0 to maximize
F(x)8, - C(x).
The first order condition is
f(x)B, = c(x);
that is, the claimant chooses the marginal claim x to equate the probability that the first
success will come on that claim times the award from winning the case to the marginal
cost.
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Judicial System without Rule of Waiver. Here the claimant can spread claims over the
two periods, coming back in period 2 if the claims brought in period I do not succeed.
The claimant chooses x, ? 0 and .x2 > 0 to maximize
I1- PI.(x,)
-C(xj)- [I - F(IX1;[C(x, +.-2 )- C-)1
Here. the first term is the probability of success in the first case times the first period
award. The second term is the probability of no success in the first case times the
probability of at ]cast one success from among claims [x1, x,+x 2] (see above) times the
reward from a victory in case 2. The third term is the total cost of the first case. The last
term is the incremental cost of the second case multiplied by the probability of a second
case.
The first order conditions are
(1) .ix ,XBI - B2) +J(x + x,.)B 2 -/fx,)q.\' - F(.,)c(.,
- [I - F(XlC(x1 + x2) +fAx0C(x + x,) = 0
and
(2) ./(.v + x,)B-[I -l F(x)c(x, +.x < 0
where (2) holds with equality if and only if x2 > 0. Assume that it is profitable to bring a
second case, which requires a sufficiently large B2 (if a second case is not profitable, a
rule of waiver has no effect). Then .,Xl+X 2)B2 - [1-F(x)]c(x+x) = 0, which we can
substitute into (I) to obtain
(3) j(xj)(B - B2) -f(x)CQxi) - J-'(.V)c(x 1) 4 .i(x1 )C(-v + x-) 0.
An Example. Consider the case of a constant hazard rate. which arises when the
probability of success in each claim is the same. Then F(x) = I - e-', for some ) > 0.
Suppose also that every claim has the same cost, so that c(x) = c and CQx) = cx. All
claims are symmetric under these assumptions. but there are still diminishing returns to
filing more and more claims and the claimant generally will not file all of them.
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The Exanmnle with Waiver. The first order condition becomes
or
e Al
C
For convenience, define 0, = ABl/c, so the last expression can be written as e* 01 or
x=logj /.
The Example with No Rule of Waiver. If x2 >0, then (2) implies
: -21XI)B2 = C&-,UIc
or
e
' '
C
Taking logs, x2 = log 02/A.
Now, for the choice of x1, (3) becomes
Aw.e- '(B,- B2)- Ae-;- c.(1- Ae- )c+ )e-"'c(x, +x2)= 0
or
AA = - /B 2 +c(l + logO2),
where this last expression uses Ax2 = log 62 from the solution for x2. We can now write
e"I = 01- (02 -- logO2).
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The term in parentheses is positive for all 0 > 1 (and unless 9 > 1,v, = 0). Thus.
comparing the solution for the case with a rule ofwaiver. the claimant files more claims
in the lirst round under a rule of waiver than without waiver, as one might expect.
Note further that
e : =- . e*'' = 0,(0,-O, -+ 1 + logO,).
thus
_
: -  
= (,-o,)(o,- )+o logO, > 0,
which implies that the total number of claims filed in two cases without a rule of waiver
(if the second case is necessary) exceeds the number of claims that will be filed in a
single case under a rule of waiver.
Finally. consider the expected number of claims brought under each regime. With no rule
of waiver, expected claims are xi 4- [1 - F(x)]x2 = x, . C"x,. Using the results above,
this expression becomes
logO. log(O'- 0, + 1 + logo')
A(O - O + I + logO,) 2
This expression can be greater or smaller than the solution for x (the expected and actual
number of claims) under a rule of waiver, log 01/A. We have evaluated the difference
numerically, and find that its sign depends on the sizes of the two parameters, O and 0,.
For example, setting 01 - 3 and allowing 0, to vary over its full possible range (from I at
the lowest given that .r positive requires A > 1 to 3 at the highest since 01 > A2), we find
that the difference rises steadily ftom zero. In this case. the expected number of claims
without a rule of waiver is higher for all (2 F (1,3], and the difference is larger the greater
is A. This suggests that a rule of waiver will reduce the variable costs of litigation.
But when O =i, a somewhat different picture emerges. The difference between the
expected number of claims without and with a rule of waiver rises above zero as (A rises
initially, but it reaches a maximum and turns negative as 0, approaches 01. And when 01
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10, the difference is negative for all 02 above approximately 4.0, so that the expected
number of claims with a rle of waiver can clearly exceed the number without a rule of
waiver for some parameter values. In particular, when 0 is "high" and the cost of delay
is not too great (01-62 is not too big), a rule of waiver actually increases the expected
number ofclaims filed.
The explanation for these findings is rather subtle. Fix 01 and consider an increase in B2,
which increases A.. Clearly, this has no effect on the number of claims brought in a
regime with rule of waiver. When there is no rule of waiver, an increase in 02 reduces the
number of claims brought in a first case, but it increases both the probability that there
will be a second case and the number of claims brought in such an event. The net eflect
on the expected number of claims can be positive or negative. We calculate that an
increase in tO: actually decreases the expected number of claims in a regime without rule
of waiver if and only if I + (01 - t)(2 -0,) -(02 -1 - logO,) < 0. If 06-02 is small (little
cost of delay), this inequality is satisfied forV2 >2+ logO0,; i.e., A. bigger than
approximately 3.15. Thus, when 01 and 62 are both large and the difference is small, the
expected number of claims in a system without a rule of waiver is relatively small
compared to the large number of arguments that the claimant brings with a rule of waiver.
Our results are only the beginning of a full treatment of the issues for reasons noted
earlier - we have not modeled the social returns to litigation or any litigation cost
externalities. But even the modest piece of the problem that we explore is quite complex
as the reader will no doubt have noticed. We can oflfir little definitive advice other than
to urge caution in the evolution of rules of waiver in the WTO (and more generally). It is
not at all obvious that social wellare will improve if tribunals insist that claimants bring
all claims to an initial proceeding lest they be waived. Particularly when the fixed costs
of additional proceedings are modest, it may be better to proceed on the strongest claims
first and then to litigate others later only if necessary. And because the fixed cost aspects
of Akrticle 21.5 compliance panels may tend to be relatively modest, special caution is
appropriate there. Compliance panels should perhaps employ a rather narrow conception
of what constitutes the "same" claim when following the Appellate Body's directive to
deny claimants a second bite of the apple.
Returning to the facts of the Bed Linen case, it is not obvious to us that India's failure to
develop its case llly on the non-attribution issue during the first proceeding should
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preclude it from raising the issue again in the compliance proceeding. Its arguments
regarding "'other factors" such as EC input and output prices had not been vetted earlier,
nor is it clear that EC would suffer an) serious prejudice if forced to address them before
the A rticle 21.5 panel. The decision by the panel and the Appellate Body to foreclose
those arguments may encourage WTO litigants to throw the "kitchen sink" into their
initial complaints and arguments, so that initial panel proceedings become even more
(and perhaps unduly) cumbersome. This is particularly true if, as we imagine being the
case, the rules of resjudicata and waiver that apply before compliance panels will apply
more generally within the system. and bar the filing of a new claims relating to the same
facts when an initial set of claims proves unsuccessful. [Gcne: This last point reveals a
bit of unease on my par, - our discussion is really about waiver applicable when the
initial claims lose, not about the special context of compliance panels where the initial
claims by hypothesis have succeeded. Are the issues there importantly different in a way
that we do not let on?]
3.2 Injury Caused by Exporters Not Individually Investigated
From an economic perspective, we agree with the Appellate Body that if only 47 percent
of the goods from the Indian exporters actually investigated were dwnped. it is most
unlikely that 100 percent of the goods firom exporters not investigated were dumped. It is
also clear from the Antidumping Agreement that fairly traded imports constitute one of
the "other factors- that may cause injury to an industry, and that such injury should not be
attributed to dumped imports. To allow the EC to presume that all exporters not
investigated were dumping under these circumstances would almost certainly inflate the
quantity of "dumped imports" above its true value, and might in theory produce an
erroneous finding that material injury resulted from dumping.
We nevertheless have two reservations about the ruling in India's favor on this issue, one
legal and one logical. First, the panel was persuaded by the argument that India's position
implies an odd lack of parallelism in the Antidumping Agreement between the imports
that are considered dumped for purposes of injury analysis, and the imports that are
considered dumped for purposes of duty collection. The Appellate Body found this
disjunction less jarring. and we might agree if the issue was simply one of construction in
the face of textual ambiguity. But as noted earlier, the Antidumping Agreement contains
a special standard of review Article 17.6(i), which requires deference to national
implementation of WTO law that rests on a "permissible" interpretation. The Appellate
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Body's suggestion that the terms "positive evidence" and "objective examination" are not
ambiguous, and do not "admit of more than one pennissibic interpretation," is a bit facile.
The EC position is essentially that in defining the quantity of "dumped imports." it can
rely on the "objective evidence" provided by the set of imports to which antidumping
duties may apply. We are hard pressed to conclude that such an interpretation of the
Agreement is not "permissible."
Second, although the report of the case is not clear on the matter, we assume that the
prospective antidumping duty (and thus the estimated margin of dumping) on imports
fi'om exporters not individually investigated would be a proper weighted average of the
margins for investigated imports, including the imports for which dumping was zero. If
this assumption is correct, and if the EC properly considered the size of the margin of
dumping in its injury analysis as required by Article 3.4 of the Agreement, it is not clear
that its overstatement of the quantity of imports would make much difference to the
outcome.
To clarify, suppose that investigated exporters represent 50% of imports. Half of them do
not dump, and for the other half the estimated dumping margin is 40%. The weighted
average dumping margin is then 20%. Now consider the other 50% of exporters not
individually investigated. In considering the injury attributable to their dumping, will it
make much difference whether the importing nation assumes that half of them are
dumping at a margin of 40%, or instead that all of them are dumping at a margin of 20%?
We assume that Europe proceeded in accordance with second type of assumption, while
the Appellate Body wanted them to proceed in accordance with the first. The difference
between the two approaches might have some economically subtle consequences -
perhaps with fewer exporters assumed to be dumping, the elasticity of supply for fairly-
traded imports would appear to be higher and thus the potential for them to replace
dumped imports if dumping ceased (rather than for domestic production to replace them)
might appear to be greater. But given the casual and non-rigorous way that injury
analysis proceeds in most antidumping cases, it is hardly clear that the outcome will be
much allected by the choice between these two approaches.
Indeed, because injury analysis is so loose in most cases, ad because the "material
injury" standard for antidumping injury is both low and elastic, we wonder whether
fidelity to the Appellate Body's ruling in the future will ever make much difference as a
practical matter. Even if the EC restates the quantity of dumped imports in accordance
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with India's proposed methodology or some other that the Appellate Body will accept, it
may be quite easy for the competent authorities once again to conclude that dumping is a
source of'material injury.
In sum, although the Appellate Body's conclusion on this issue has some appeal from an
economic standpoint, its legal foundation is shaky. Further, the choice between the now
illegal approach of the EC, and the approach preferred by the Appellate Body, is likely to
have few consequences Ibr future cases.
3.3 Deference to the Panel on the "Relevant Factors" Issue
The Appellate Body's deference to the panel on the question whether the EC considered
all "relevant factors" in its injury analysis raises no issues of note. Deference to the "trier
of fact" on factual issues is routine in many legal systems, and is certainly a central tenet
of appellate review in the WTO. Absent a showing of bias or abuse by India, the
Appellate Body presumed that the panel had satisfied itself on this essentially factual
question, and would not allow the issue to be revisited under the guise of an argument
that the panel failed to make an adequate investigation . a "procedural" matter. We can
imagine cases where a panel might so fail in its duties to investigate factual issues that a
reversal of its findings tight be warranted, but India did not make enough of a showing
here to convince the Appellate Body, and we would have no basis for second guessing
that judgment.
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